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Let us try to think of a different time, where arguments over the nature, 
timing, and goals of education were highly disputed, not just because 
there must be contentious views on what we imagine when we imagine 
education, but, more pointedly, because these debates were on the verge 
of articulating an unasked question: can education and freedom meet? 
And let us try to narrate this story in an uncanny time, moving back and 
forth between then and now, here and there, absence and presence. 
Think, then, of this other history as proposing an allegory for our own. 
Then, try to keep open a different sense of 'time out': Can we freely associate 
and still call what we are doing education? 
Between 1942-1944, a series of "Extraordinary Meetings" occurred in 
the British Psychoanalytical Society in London over what would be the 
future directions of child psychoanalysis. The integrity of the Society 
would also become part of the stakes because a crucial decision members 
would face was whether one Society could hold different and clashing 
theoretical orientations to psychoanalytic practice. This crisis of knowl- 
edge, now known as The Freud-Klein Controversies1, took its name from 
the key protagonists involved: Melanie Klein and Anna Freud.2 Out of the 
"Extraordinary Meetings," the Society organized a series of Controversial 
Discussions which were meant to explore the theoretical divergences 
between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. The British Psychoanalytical 
Society's Controversial Discussions debated a key tension that educa- 
tional institutions know well: whether its internal workings could tolerate 
its own scientific differences or, just as crucially, the difficulties offered by 
its theory, practice, and training. And the topic that haunts the partici- 
pants, in ways that continue to stun, concerns how psychoanalytic prac- 
tice can think the directions, timing, evidence, force, and goals of 
education for both adults and children. For anyone interested in the 
promise and perils of education, a large question these Controversies 
leave us with is: What then is education that it should give us such trou- 
ble? 
In this paper, I try and tell something of how these Controversies 
became so controversial-then and now-not just for the history of child 
analysis it recounts but also for what we might think about in our own 
history of education. "The FreudIKlein Controversies" are one of the 
most documented touchstones in the development of child psychoanaly- 
sis. I think this is the case for two reasons. First, the Controversies leave 
us with precocious questions: Where does misery come from and where 
does freedom come from? What is the status of aggression and negativity 
in psychical life? What is the relation between external and internal 
events and between phantasy and reality? And crucially, if these are our 
concerns, what can education even mean? And second, the Controversies 
return the question of what psychoanalytic knowledge is-how it is 
made, justified, argued over, and experienced-a question that we would 
do well to ask of our own educational knowledge. For the sake of these 
reasons, let us turn our attention to the status and boundaries of episte- 
mology and ontology in questions of learning and teaching. Jacqueline 
Rose (1993) puts the dilemma boldly: "if knowledge borders on fantasy, 
fantasy is always in part fantasy about (the borders of) knowledge." She 
then goes on to  revise old questions relevant to any endeavour of life: 
"Where does the possibility of knowledge come from? Can we conceive 
of a limit point where it ceases to be?" (Rose 1993,174). And, in conceiv- 
ing such a limit, say, of thinking knowledge and phantasy as no longer 
opposed, where then does the possibility of education emerge and when 
does it cease to be? 
The force of these traumatic conflicts in terms of the Controversial Dis- 
cussions is tied to earlier events, suggesting the uncanny time of trauma, 
what Sigmund Freud termed, Nachtraglichkeit,3 a sense of time that 
returns and revises old events by way of new encounters and may remind 
us of our own uneven development; that it takes two estranged stories to 
make one experience. Julia Kristeva (Kristeva 2001, 69) puts the narrative 
dilemma of duration this way: "We must tell the story of our life, then, 
before we can ascribe meaning to it." When Ernest Jones founded the 
British Psychoanalytical Society in 1919, its first problem was one of 
membership. In her history of the Controversial Discussions, Pearl King 
narrated the founding problem as one of education: "Who were appropri- 
ate people to be members of a psychoanalytic society and what basic the- 
ories should they hold?" (King 1991, 11). This sense of education tries to 
address how a profession legitimises itself, justifies its internal authority, 
and lends continuity for itself over time. But if settled too quickly, if asked 
too soon, membership requirements assume individuals come to a profes- 
sion already formed and foreclose the very problem of where theory 
comes from and how education undergoes its own vicissitudes despite the 
theories held. If the question emerges from a certain anxiety over whether 
education can settle the problem of trying to know in advance the knowl- 
edge required, its answers will also repeat the force of the very anxiety 
that delivered the initial question. We will meet this dynamic by way of 
letter exchanges. 
By 1927, the debates over technique and theory in child analysis 
between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud had already heated up and were 
argued over in the FreudIJones correspondence (Paskauskas 1993).4 In a 
vitriolic exchange of letters beginning in the spring of 1927, Ernest Jones 
wrote to Freud about Melanie Klein's pioneering work with children. She 
had just immigrated to London from Berlin a year earlier and was wel- 
comed into the British Psychoanalytical Society. While Jones knew of the 
rivalry between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, in a letter to Freud he 
attempted to defend Klein's work, telling Freud that Anna Freud's work 
with children was immature and stemmed from an incomplete analysis, or 
in Jones's words, "imperfectly analyzed resistances" (No. 502, p.617). 
This comment brought out Freud's wrath, since he had analysed his 
daughter.5 Freud's first response is measured and distanced; he would 
rather see Science settle disputes over the veracity of knowledge. But he 
was also chagrined over how disputes within psychoanalysis were reduced 
to the analysis of the analyst's personal flaws: 
When two analysts have differing opinions on some point, one may be 
fully justified, in ever so many cases, in assuming that the mistaken view of 
one of them stems from his having been insufficiently analysed, and he 
therefore allows himself to be influenced by his complexes to the detriment 
of science. But in practical polemics such an argument is not permissible, 
for it is at the disposal of each party, and does not reveal on whose side the 
error lies. We are generally agreed to renounce arguments of this sort, and, 
in the case of differences of opinion, to leave resolutions to advancements 
in empirical knowledge (No. 503, p.619). 
Jones breaks this rule again and in his next letter insisted that his 
observations were not about "practical polemics" but were "private and 
personal" (No. 504, p.620). A few letters later, Freud recounts one of the 
first paper fights between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. He worries that 
his daughter's work is not being published in London because of Klein's 
influence. His anger is directed at  Jones's earlier insistence that Anna 
Freud's work suffers from her "incomplete analysis." Leaving the third 
person, Freud breaks his own rule when he writes to Jones on September 
23, 1927: 
In London you are organizing a regular campaign against Anna's child 
analysis, accusing her of not having been analysed deeply enough, a 
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reproach that you repeat in a letter to me. I had to point out to you that 
such a criticism is just as dangerous as it is impermissible. Is anyone actu- 
ally analysed enough? I can assure you that Anna has been analysed longer 
and more thoroughly than, for example, you yourself (No. 508, p.624). 
Steiner's (1993) view of this exchange reaches the heart of the dispute, 
not in terms of who is analysed best, as if this question was beyond analy- 
sis, but in terms of the difficult knowledge of psychoanalysis itself. 
One can grasp almost physically the impossibility of distinguishing 
clearly, or rather distinguishing absolutely, between the mixture of episte- 
mological, personal, and emotional elements in play in the defense of cer- 
tain principles in the field of psychoanalysis. It is as if the unconscious as 
an object of research were taking its revenge, making its presence felt as 
the subject, impossible to  control with any assurance (Steiner 1993, 
xxxix). 
And without any assurance on how psychical processes are enacted in 
research, since indeed, the concept of the unconscious breaks open the 
wishes to  assure, how then can knowledge advance without being 
revengeful? We might rework this observation for education as well: 
defences of educational practices are a strange combination of epistemol- 
ogy, desire, and affective investments in being known and in knowing 
others. But precisely because of these elements, indeed, the mix up of 
phantasy and reality when trying to  understand what knowledge can 
mean for the self and other, education cannot be mastered. And herein 
begins the trouble. 
My emphasis is on what led up to  the Controversies and how these 
events can be used as an occasion to  consider our own controversies of 
knowledge, research, and authority in education. This is because the Con- 
troversies spanned the gamut of education. One dimension magnified 
affective relations between adults in professional education and how their 
disputes affected the formation of schooling for analysts. A second 
dimension concerned the question of how to think education as a relation 
of authority between children and adults. However, rather than begin 
with the assumption of what children need or even what they should 
know and then expect authority as an answer, the adult's wish for educa- 
tion took centre stage and so, authority became unhinged from conscious- 
ness. A third dimension raised the problem of affective breakdowns 
within institutional education and whether, for instance psychoanalytic 
theory could intervene in the very structure of its own education. Finally, 
there was the querulous couple of knowledge and pedagogy, animated by 
the questions of what invokes the desire to learn or not learn at all. The 
unasked question was, how does knowledge become insight as opposed to 
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revenge or compliance? These four dimensions of education, in our own 
time, have been foreclosed by the testing industry, zero tolerance policies, 
industry measures of accountability, and, the reduction of knowledge to 
information and its technologies. The consequences of such reductive 
measures have been severe: the denial of freedom, the insufficiency of sex 
education and creative responses to our time of AIDS, the ending of the 
grace of a second chance and the unasked question, indeed, the forgetting 
of pedagogical conditions that might allow learning its surprises and free 
associations, and schooling a more interesting transformation. 
As I will try to illustrate, the FreudKlein Controversies offer us a way 
to rethink crucial dilemmas by beginning at the beginning, so to say: with 
the problem of distinguishing reality and phantasy in education and then, 
over what constitutes the adequacy of educational claims to know itself 
and others. I read these disputes as a story of terminable and interminable 
education and, so, work the differences between institutional education, 
where time is linear, chronological, and ordered and where relationships 
are pre-programmed, and that of existential learning, where recursive 
time urges meaning in unanticipated, belated, and incomplete ways. A 
different way of posing the dilemma is to consider just what the gap 
between knowledge and its realization can mean in and for the education 
of adults who then return to educate other adults and children and youth. 
This aporia of knowledge and realization is acute in professional educa- 
tion where theories and practices take on rather urgent formulations and 
demands, and where failure in education waivers between the poles of 
blaming educators and blaming students or their families; a breakdown of 
authority reminiscent of the FreudIJones debate. So, how can we think 
about the relation between the structure and edifices of education and the 
knowledge we make of those structures, ideas and people? Which experi- 
ences come to count as learning and how do they measure up to formal 
theories of development? How are the stage and the staging of education 
both influenced by and susceptible to participants' unconscious phan- 
tasies and kernels of historical truth? Just as the Controversies argued 
over the differences between adult and child analysis, this conflict is carried 
over to education: what are the differences between, say, the educator's 
education and that of the children? When is education ever complete? 
Educational Issues 
The psychoanalytic theories of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud were 
derived from their work with children, their attempts to  listen to the 
child's symptoms, their innovation and conservation of Freud's thought, 
and, perhaps just as significantly, their own self-analysis. At times, their 
respective writings seem to shadow each other; both wrote about school 
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phobias, reading difficulties, children who bully others or are subject to 
being attacked, children who lose things, including their intellectual 
curiosity, problems of precocity and sexuality, and physical expressions of 
anxiety such as stuttering, tics, night terrors, and tantrums. They heard in 
the strange utterances of their young analysands as they played, complex 
emotional dramas. Over the course of their long careers, they would 
wrestle with ordinary symptoms that were not, during their time, given 
over to children: unhappiness, suffering, depression, and feelings of lone- 
liness, being unwanted, and being unloved. And precisely because their 
objects of research were so elusive-made up from dreams, play, draw- 
ings, fantasy, inchoate longings, and even arguments with their young 
analysands-they both worked extremely hard to establish the validity of 
their interpretive claims. What made this labour so difficult was that the 
affective experiences they explored belonged, as we will see, not just to 
the children they saw; both women also wrestled with these very human 
dilemmas in their own lives and confronted these affects yet again when 
trying to convince others of their theory's relevance. Thus, from the 
beginning of their research and practice, the boundaries between objective 
and subjective knowledge were permeable and made even more so by the 
trade in accusations over whose theory was more loyal to that of Sigmund 
Freud and, second, whether either of their theories preordained the very 
symptoms that the practice purported to cure. This second difficulty, a 
common criticism in education as well, also issued from the disparities 
between what Klein and Anna Freud claimed for the child. The biggest 
claim concerned their different senses of the poesies of psychical life and 
the dilemmas we must encounter to become human. 
While both women began with an acknowledgement of the utter 
dependency of the immature human and how this dependency is a struc- 
turing condition of psychical life and relations with others, their research 
strategies and the consequences each of them drew from this dependency 
diverged. Klein, for example, felt that the primal distress made from not 
knowing, what Freud called Hilflosigkeit, enraged and frustrated the 
infant to such an extent that this anxiety and aggression marked every 
moment of development. Anna Freud did not attribute to the infant such 
a formative aggression or sadism and felt the ego's gradual development, 
with the aid of its mechanisms of defence, was adept at learning to subli- 
mate instinctual conflict and so, be addressed by the demands of external 
reality. Indeed, when it came to the life of the child, Anna Freud argued 
that the child was most influenced by the external world. This insistence 
spoke to the profound difference between how each considered what the 
conditions of external reality and internal phantasies mean for a child's 
capacity to tolerate anxiety and frustration and then what it might take to 
make something creative from this difficult mix up. On the question of 
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where affects come from, both analysts answered very differently because 
they had different views on the reasons for the gap between knowledge 
and its realization, therefore, their clinical use of interpretation diverged 
significantly. Melanie Klein believed the child could benefit from deep 
interpretations while Anna Freud felt the child in analysis would benefit 
more from the analyst's position as a sort of role model or what she 
called "ego ideal." While Anna Freud did not eschew the importance of 
phantasies for the life of the child, she also held the view, through her the- 
ories of the ego's defence mechanisms, that there were three sources of 
anxiety: objective, instinctual, and super-ego. For Klein, anxiety was con- 
stitutional and only had one source: the death drive. 
Melanie Klein's clinical work with very young children and infants laid 
the foundations for theories of object relations and for her difficult claim 
that phantasies structure knowledge of both the inside and outside world. 
Her insistence upon the primacy of phantasies takes us to a very different 
understanding of interiority and knowledge. In bracketing the considera- 
tion of outside processes and so in trying to isolate the profundity of sad- 
ness and desolation, Klein is able to think about how instinctual pushes 
and defenses against them come too early for the human, even as these 
processes set the conditions for further development. Not knowing is, for 
Klein, another way to consider phantasy. These phantasies are there, 
Klein believed, from the beginning of life and offer, in the words of Juliet 
Mitchell: 
An unconscious commentary on instinctual life and links feelings to 
objects and creates a new amalgam: the world of imagination. Through its 
ability to phantasize, the baby tests out, 'primitively' thinks about it, its 
experiences of inside and outside. External reality can gradually affect and 
modify the crude hypothesis phantasy sets up. Phantasy is both the activity 
and its products (Mitchell 1998,23). 
This 'commentary' is inchoate, pre-verbal, and fragmentary. It repre- 
sents the baby's premature attempt to master bodily anxiety, an anxiety 
that, in Klein's view, is crude, terrifying, aggressive, and subject to turning 
back against the subject. And yet, phantasies, however negative, are also 
the condition from which identification and symbolization emerges 
because the baby, from the beginning, equates her or his bodily anxiety 
with objects in the world. Through the infant's projection of her or his 
bodily sensations into that first other, 'meanings,' or what Klein (1975, 
221) called "unreal reality," chaotically return, but then also have to be 
defended against and eventually mourned. It was, for Klein, psychical 
reality that made cognitive processes possible. 
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Before, during, and after the Controversial Discussions Melanie Klein 
and Anna Freud would argue-with those in their field and in lectures to 
the general public-over the aetiology of anxiety, defence, and sublima- 
tion. They would privilege different causes because their theories 
attempted to approximate the material from which psychic experiences 
and interiority are made: endogenous or exogenous, nature or nurture, 
biology or culture, reality or phantasy? These are arguments over the con- 
ditions of being, indeed over what conditions being prior to its entrance 
into language and culture, and then, once the human enters into the 
world, how the world affects being, how being imagines the world. Taken 
together, their theories offer significant questions for how education can 
be imagined because each analyst was also concerned with what makes 
curiosity in the first place, how imagination loses its wonder, and further, 
how curiosity can become important again. For Klein, the capacity to 
symbolize begins in anxiety, essentially made from phantasies, and this 
would set the stage for how the baby uses and tolerates knowledge. There 
would always be an excess to curiosity, for at least in Klein's view, curios- 
ity also covers the wish not to know. For Klein, the line between terror 
and learning is never absolute and education may well act out this confu- 
sion. For Anna Freud, curiosity also emerges from instinctual conflict but 
conflict represents a precursor to the work of reality testing. This means 
that the uses and tolerances of knowledge have to do with ego develop- 
ment and environmental support and with distinguishing between real 
angst and internal conflict. Thus, Anna Freud argued that educative mea- 
sures should be joined with child analysis, for education could offer the 
child strategies of reality-testing. 
Klein, however, felt there was not much difference between adult analy- 
sis and child analysis, at least not in terms of the central rule of analysis: 
free association should structure the analytic s e s s i ~ n . ~  Essentially, she 
argued that free association was contrary to the goals of education, as 
was the allowance of the uninhibited expressions of rage, hatred, and ter- 
ror that Klein documented so powerfully through her case studies of chil- 
dren. Free association cannot admit loyalty, censorship, or the demands of 
reality and logic. Nor can its meanings be secured or tested against reality. 
Free association, allowing anything to come to mind, makes knowledge 
and phantasies indistinguishable. And it was this indiscretion that her 
interpretation would try to contain. 
And, in a sense that perhaps even Melanie Klein could not admit, she 
was right about the antagonism of education and free association. When 
the Controversial Discussions came to the education of analysts, there 
would be no free association of ideas and schools of thought for either 
side. While each side could argue passionately over theories of learning 
Pen cap 95 
and whether pedagogy would be of use to the analysis of children, when 
the debates turned to the education of analysts and their training, no 
comparable argument ensued. It was as though adults had somehow out- 
grown or even exchanged the nature of their being for compliance to 
institutional demands. Education for adults was reduced to a certain loy- 
alty toward carrying forth and thus having to defend a school of thought. 
There was plenty of discussion over the nature of the analytic relation, the 
goals, timing and activities in child analysis, and the nature of psychoana- 
lytic knowledge. But what was lost, when it came to the education of 
adults, was the problem of where the adult's curiosity would come from 
and how theory emerges from the strangely singular encounter of the ana- 
lytic session. 
These problems of imagination and theory are intractable because in 
the education of professionals it is difficult to pry apart learning ideas 
from learning authority. There are always tensions among trying to learn 
how to practice, proving one's competence in spite of having to learn, and 
generalizing the unique encounter to situations that defy prediction. This 
volatile combination of anticipation and retrospection places at odds two 
sorts of authority: the authority of ideas and the authority of the learner. 
How does authority transfer from one site to  another? The tension 
becomes catastrophic, however, if institutional design cannot acknowl- 
edge this paradox (Safouan 2000). But secondly, institutional disavowal 
of the conflict that inaugurates thinking about practice in the first place 
also plays out intimately in an individual's education. Then the problem 
is, why is it so difficult to acknowledge the tensions and conflict in one's 
own education? Is there something reminiscent about professional educa- 
tion that brings us back to earlier episodes of learning authority and the 
work of making knowledge adequate? 
The difficulty of determining once and for all the difference between 
adults and children in terms of the time of learning is repeated in the dis- 
sonant and uneasy place of education in psychoanalytic thought. Some- 
times education refers to child rearing; sometimes it refers to didactic 
inculcation of rigid morality; sometimes education marks the larger 
social's disavowal of conflict and the difficulties of life; and, at other 
times, it is compared to authoritarianism that was thought to be the 
source of repression. In the early history of child analysis, a more positive 
sense of education linked the exchange of ignorance for knowledge to 
becoming enlightened, placing education close to the Kantian Auf- 
klarung? reasonable knowledge that can be put into service for the dual 
purpose of curing ignorance and repression and becoming reflective. As 
for the first purpose, a rather vicious tautology was thus put into place: 
education causes repression and is the cure for repression. If such a defin- 
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ition foreclosed the question of where repression comes from by placing 
it solely in social processes and ignoring psychical demands, there was 
still the problem of why education as social engineering is resisted. As for 
the second purpose, the work of becoming reflective raised the very prob- 
lem of what might count as cure: consciousness cannot guarantee its own 
transparency because reason cannot escape psychical dynamics or its own 
dream work such as distortion, displacement, deferral, substitution, 
repression, and turning into its o p p o ~ i t e . ~  If reason seems to carry its own 
justifications, it must also defend against that which resists justification, 
namely the unconscious. 
Yet more than once Freud called education one of the impossible pro- 
fessions and by this he meant a double impossibility. One concerned the 
problem of why knowledge is often resisted and how phantasies exert 
more persuasive power and pressure over judgement than does reality. 
The other impossibility was directed to the work of educating: those who 
practice as educators must struggle with the inherent difficulty of trying 
to persuade individuals to change the ways they think, believe, and work. 
This places educator's efforts fairly close to that of the cajoling or punish- 
ing parents and their functions of authority. In other words, relations of 
authority are caught in dynamics of desire: desire for learning, learning 
for love, and desiring to both be and have the authority knowledge 
bestows. What is impossible is the idea that education occurs without 
trouble. Along with this seemingly pessimistic view, Freud also put great 
faith in the possibility that knowledge can help individuals construct 
insight, support thoughtfulness, work though neurosis, and prepare their 
own way for love of ideas. He felt that learning from knowledge of psy- 
chical reality, a knowledge that must be made retrospectively, might allow 
individuals to suffer differently and, over the course of their lives, ask 
themselves to create ever new answers to the interminable life question of 
what happiness and unhappiness can mean. And while it seems as though 
Freud would like to have education in these two contradictory ways, as 
both resistance and as insight, Pontalis argues that there is no contradic- 
tion to such an approach: "One must indeed encourage parents and edu- 
cators not to lie to children, not to answer with 'childish sayings: in other 
words with myths concocted by adults for children, but one must not 
expect such lznowledge to replace the unconscious" (1981, 96). 
Does such ambivalence over the uses of knowledge and that which 
resists its use work in the analyst's education as well? Pontalis's discussion 
of the stakes of learning to become an analyst suggests the ambivalence 
has more to do with the very processes psychoanalytic theory tries to clar- 
ify than its actual knowledge: "Psychoanalytic theory harbours the very 
mechanisms which bring it to light: resistance, repression, distortion, dis- 
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placement, repetition etc" (1981, 106). The use of knowledge, then, is not 
a problem of application but rather, of constructing narratives and under- 
standing something about their affective resonances for the self and other. 
This expressive drama structures psychoanalytic education. It also is a key 
dilemma for teacher education, where the pressure to apply ideas shuts 
out consideration of why we feel we must rush to learn or even try to 
catch learning within the parenthesis of 'teachable moments.' 
As with learning to teach, psychoanalytic training is organized by its 
apprenticeship and is made from two different kinds of knowledge that 
are assumed to be at odds: practical and theoretical. The actual experi- 
ence of being analysed is a significant part of one's analytic education and 
not only because it distinguished the analyst from those who practiced 
what Freud (1910) called, when he founded the International Psychoana- 
lytic Association, "wild analysis." In conceptualising how one learns from 
the practices of psychoanalysis, that is, how one becomes an analyst, 
Freud placed a tension at the heart of the analyst's education, making 
sure they respected the gap between knowing about psychoanalysis and 
being analysed, between intellectualisation and becoming oneself. It is a 
demand, for both education and psychoanalysis, that must be learned 
over and over. In Eigen's more contemporary view, "Psychoanalytic expe- 
rience is not the same as knowing about it. Patient and analyst are faced 
with the problem of passing from the wish to 'know thyself, accept thy- 
self, be thyself' to becoming the reality such words suggest. There is a gap 
between knowing about X and being X" (1997, 213). And in some sense, 
education as a method should not and indeed cannot fill that gap. Yet the 
contemporary field of education takes a different view: there shall be a 
meeting of theory and practice, and it shall be experienced as one learns 
to teach. From an analytic vantage, the very conflict that inaugurates 
knowledge is foreclosed in rhe idealized couple of theory and practice. 
Experiencing an analysis was a prerequisite for the work of analysing 
others, but by the time of the Controversies, the meaning of the analysis 
for education threatened to break apart under the weight of the question 
of whether this training analysis should be aligned with a particular 
school of thought. This was a deeply personal issue because one's own 
analysis is the heart of one's practice and any outside criticism is a very 
delicate matter. But also, education for the analyst had two warring 
dimensions: theoretical knowledge of the unconscious and subjective or 
idiomatic knowledge of the self through one's own analysis. For these 
dimensions to be meaningful rather than be placed into a hierarchy of 
value, they must, by nature, be thought of and encountered as at odds. It 
could be a productive tension if it could allow for a different sort of lis- 
tening practice, capable of reading, as Freud put it, "between the lines of 
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[the analysand's] complaint and the story of his illness" (1913, 140). Part 
of the Controversies was a vehement argument over what complaints 
might signify to the analysands and the analyst and where the place of 
education might figure: within the nature of the complaint or somewhere 
in the story of illness? 
The Controversies over education invoked a sort of splitting between, 
on the one side, good education from bad education and, on the other 
side, bad education from worse education. This gradient is not so easily 
communicated because of a necessary entanglement of morality with 
autonomy and of knowledge with desire. Some of the difficulty emerges 
because education is never, a t  least in analytic terms, solely a rational 
affair and thus cannot secure itself through rational persuasion or better 
planning. Indeed, these very methods are not outside of anxiety. How 
does one distinguish absolutely rational education from irrational educa- 
tion? Another part of the difficulty is that the Controversies placed at 
stake both the education of the adult analyst and that of the child 
analysands. If education vacillates between the wishes of the adult and 
the desires of the child, if the knowledge promised could neither meet the 
demand to know nor insure the capacity to believe, then how does one 
consider the directionality of influence and susceptibility? The problem is 
that at times, the Controversies tried to foreclose the dilemmas education 
represents because the debates acted out something agonizing about the 
frontiers of education itself: education is made and broken somewhere 
between reality and phantasy. One part of the debate intensified the ques- 
tion of whether educative goals should or even could become the key that 
unlocks the analysis of children. Another part occupied the education of 
analysts, but, there, reduced education to its most rigid: didactic training 
and course work. The literal question of how to think about the differ- 
ences between child and adult analysis returned to the education of the 
analyst: what can theoretical conflict mean for the analysts' education? 
There is a certain irony in this split, for while some of the arguments 
had to do with which psychical and social conflicts children experienced, 
when it came to adult education, part of the desire was to eliminate con- 
flictive views from the adult's experience. Whereas the tensions of educa- 
tion are stressed in the first instance of child analysis, when it came to the 
training of analysts, education was reduced to an answer to the question 
of which theory and which practice shall dominate training. Both sides 
did grapple with how education influences not just the learner but also 
the imperatives of the teacher. However, while education in child analysis 
was admitted as a danger (as both inhibition and sublimation), when it 
came to the education of the analysts, the danger lost its constitutive 
power. Or, so it seemed. 
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Theory Wars 
While the Controversies offer insight into the large question of what can 
or should constitute educative efforts in analysis and in the training of 
analysts, a comparable debate occupies the humanities, social sciences, 
and sciences. These present debates include the following: the positions 
one might take in relation to knowledge, the adequacy of curriculum, the 
future of academic training, and, the status of theoretical knowledge in 
relation to experience, world relating, empiricism, and transformations of 
its subjects. Within each problem, we can find disagreements over whether 
education should be on the side of affirmation or destruction, whether 
education should be personal or impersonal, and whether education 
should provide role models or neutrality. As in the Controversies, all of 
these debates question the purpose, conditions, and veracity of education, 
not just in terms of the present but also in terms of the imagined future of 
our ideas. Whereas many contemporary discussions characterize debates 
in the field of education as 'the culture wars,' and these wars include con- 
ceptualising and altering material practices of inequality and relations of 
power, and, in some basic sense, stabilizing knowledge relations between 
identity and politics, I want to offer another sort of dilemma that has to 
do with the fantasy of knowledge: theory wars, or clashes in how the 
world is encountered and represented. 
Theory wars consist of disputes over human nature, problems of gener- 
alization and singularity, and arguments between theory and practice. 
Taking sides, becoming rigid in explanations, refusing to consider internal 
contradictions within schools of thought, and personalizing the stakes 
suggest some of the symptoms of theory wars. Other symptoms are con- 
temporary: searching for binary oppositions without a theory of binary 
operations, tracking down ideologies without a view of the uses of illu- 
sion, worrying whether arguments are won or lost on essentialist or con- 
structivist grounds, and avoiding our own implication in knowledge. 
Theory wars express our elusive desire or urge for knowledge, what 
Melanie Klein (1930) called "the epistemophilic in~ t inc t . "~  Here, the 
unconscious question might be, following Rose (1993): where does theo- 
retical knowledge come from? 
Otto Kernberg offers some of the consequences of refusing this preco- 
cious question in education. In "Thirty Methods to Destroy the Creativity 
of Psychoanalytic Candidates," his second method states: "It is important 
for the instructor to keep in mind that it is the conclusions that Freud 
arrived a t  that have to be taught and memorised, not the pvocess of 
Freud's thinking.. ." (1996, 1032). When education is reduced to its most 
didactic form, when the curriculum forecloses the learner's capacity to 
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argue with it, and when knowledge itself is reduced to zero tolerance, the 
possibility of doubting the knowledge proffered is diminished and, ironi- 
cally, knowledge within the curriculum can never possess any authority. 
What can it mean to think through, or work through, education, not 
from the vantages of its certainties or the edifice of its claims, but from 
the point of view of its vulnerabilities, questions, and, to borrow from 
Roy Schafer's observation on the problem of constructing evidence, from 
the vantage of its "inherent ambiguity" (1994, 361)? Part of the inherent 
ambiguity of thinking has to do with how difficult it is to separate the 
desire for knowledge from the pleasure of knowing and, then, from the 
aggressive compulsion to protect and save the knowledge made. This is 
the underside of Klein's epistemophilic instinct: the drive to know cannot 
distinguish the difference between knowing a thing and taking possession 
of it. 
So far, many of my observations are applicable to a range of academic 
fields. Recent studies on epistemology suggest, to put it bluntly, that a 
field without controversies is a dead field (Dosse, 1999; Herrnstein-Smith, 
1997). It is generally accepted that knowledge proceeds by breakdown, 
but there are some unique qualities within psychoanalysis that allow for 
consideration of resistance to learning or just how difficult it is to learn 
from the breakdown of meaning and our desires to know. Unlike argu- 
ments in the fields of human science, and education in particular, which 
try to ally themselves most closely to their own reality principal, the spe- 
cific debates within psychoanalysis reside on the borderline of the plea- 
sure principal and that which lies beyond. Psychoanalysis is, for the most 
part, not only made from a theory of conflict, elaborated most severely 
over the course of the most devastating wars of the twentieth century. But 
just as significantly, its practices depend upon the practitioner's practical 
and theoretical understanding of how its theories can say something 
about her or his own unconscious wishes for the self and other. In other 
words, psychoanalytic objects of research, such as neuroses, psychoses, 
anxieties, resistance, affects, and defences, also fashion the interiority of 
the researcher (Steiner 1985).1° 
Admitting the practitioner's susceptibility to the very objects of her or 
his practice is rather different from other claims on the use of empathy in 
fields like education and anthropology.11 At their best, these fields depend 
upon the researcher's capacity for verstehen, or understanding tied to the 
desire to know. But understanding is projected outside toward social 
processes and not turned inward toward encountering the difficulties con- 
gealed in the problem of what satisfies or provokes the desire to under- 
stand and be understood. Here, we encounter a very different 
conceptualization of theory, namely the unconscious. For example, in the 
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work of teaching, we can identify a defensive move, what Gardner calls 
"the furor to teach" (1994, 3).  But it is extremely rare to consider this as 
a problem of defending against one's own helplessness in the face of the 
other, or as tied to one's subjective history of learning and its disappoint- 
ments. Within psychoanalytic practices, the concept of transference, for 
example, references and confronts the problem of boundaries not just 
between self and other but between illness and health and judgment and 
perception (Mannoni 1999), and these vacillations render theory and 
practice as a struggle between reality and phantasy. In her paper on tech- 
nique submitted to the Society during the Controversies, Marjorie Brier- 
ley (1943, 619) spoke about "the spur of therapeutic anxiety," a sort of 
collusion with the pain made from the analyst's attempt to relate to the 
suffering of others and still experience resistance to her own unconscious 
helplessness. That psychoanalysis knows conflict so well, that it flourishes 
by argumentation, that its practices expect resistance, deflection, dis- 
avowal, and acting out, for example, on the part of analysands and ana- 
lysts through the transference and the counter-transference suggests that, 
at least theoretically, institutions of psychoanalysis should be capable of 
encountering breakdowns in meanings in ways that do not repeat the 
breakdown. Moreover, while this theoretical hope is tied to the wish that 
there might be collegiality in spite of disagreement and that psychoana- 
lytic institutions can learn to tolerate internal frustration, the history of 
psychoanalysis is made from clashes of theory and practice: whether and 
how psychoanalysis can affect its own institutional imaginary. This ques- 
tion also haunts the historicity of education, that is, whether and how 
education can affect its own institutional imaginary. 
Child Analysis before "The Controversies" 
Child analysis has always had its controversies, not just from those look- 
ing in who continue to express a strange combination of horror and 
incredulity toward psychoanalytic claims about childhood conflict, sexual 
researching, and infantile sexuality. The claims being made in the name of 
the child were startling: children suffered, lived a complex inner world, 
thought about sexuality without any help from education, and were sus- 
ceptible to their own libidinal and aggressive drives. And while this out- 
side incredulity was not surprising-after all, psychoanalysts expect 
resistance-psychoanalytic communities were also ambivalent about the 
directions, influence, and training of child analysts. The actual child pre- 
sented a significant dilemma to one of the goals of adult analysis: recon- 
struction of the repressed past in terms of its present repetitions. Were 
children capable of transferential relations with the analyst when the 
child's actual authority figures-the parents-were still central in the 
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child's life? How could the child reconstruct the past before it could even 
be established? Or, just how archaic is psychical conflict? Was the child 
even capable of free association? And yet, the child also presented a possi- 
bility for the curative power of psychoanalysis: the early working through 
of neurosis may allow for a better, more insightful adulthood. 
Hermine Hug-Hellmuth is credited with sketching out the foundations 
of child analysis. Her 1920 paper, "On the technique of child-analysis," 
began with a set of cautions that urged analysts to distinguish child analy- 
sis from its adult counter-point.12 In Hug-Hellmuth's view, the analyst 
must be the child's advocate, work to "break the ice," and establish rap- 
port by asking for the child's help. The analyst was also to construct the 
content of play, supplying the child with scenarios that would form the 
basis of the child's talk. These scenarios were to address the child's con- 
scious perceptions, and the analyst must be cautious in offering interpre- 
tations. Mainly, the analyst was to reassure the child of her or his good- 
ness, thus linking self-esteem and confidence building to the problem of 
undoing neurosis. Two years after Freud's (1926) call for child analysis to 
have an educative value, Hug-Hellmuth defined the nature of that value: 
"The curative and educative work of analysis does not consist only in 
freeing the young creature from his sufferings, it must also furnish him 
with moral and aesthetic values" (1926, 138). This view put child analysis 
in the developmental service of Aufklarung. And while, at least in the 
beginning, Melanie Klein adhered to  this view on education, her own 
son's analytic education suggested that educative measures were not suffi- 
cient to the prevention of neurosis and intellectual inhibition. Indeed, the 
scarey idea that Klein would try to confront is that educative measures 
suffered from these very symptoms: something within education can make 
US nervous. 
How did Melanie Klein come to leave behind her earlier faith in educa- 
tive measures and shift her practice from analytic education to psycho- 
analysis? The same year that Hug-Hellmuth gave her paper on the 
techniques of child analysis, Klein's own technique began to question the 
dominant suppositions of Hug-Hellmuth and Anna Freud. For them, anx- 
iety developed from external circumstances; guilt and moral anxiety 
occurred late in the child's development because Oedipal anxieties were a 
later development. This meant that psychoanalysis must be closely allied 
with didactic education, opening some choices for the child, but foreclos- 
ing others. Originally, like Anna Freud, Melanie Klein held a strong belief 
in the curative process of knowledge for character development and for 
liberating intellectual inhibitions. Her first case study, reported to the 
Budapest Society in 1919 and one that served as her admittance into the 
Society, described her progress with her own child-Erich's-psychoana- 
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lytic education. There, she claimed that in answering Erich's questions 
honestly and by urging him to give up his religious illusions and supersti- 
tious explanations of sex by offering him accurate knowledge, Erich 
would be able to free his intellectual inhibitions. But Erich remained 
unsatisfied with his mother's rational explanations, and, in the face of 
rational knowledge, he continued to prefer his phantasies. His symptoms 
of running away from home, even at  a very early age, were not broken by 
rational information. Moreover, Erich refused to believe the information 
offered and so, he stopped asking questions. 
Petot's study of Melanie Klein's early theories, suggest the psychoana- 
lytic problem: 
. . . on the first occasion the approach to the unconscious was only a 
means toward a project of elitist pedagogy in the context of an ideology 
very near to that of the Aufklarung, the rationalist philosophy of enlight- 
enment, critical spirit, free thought, and the rejection of authority and reli- 
gion. In Melanie Klein's real practice, this ideology served as the 
rationalization of a narcissistic approach to Erich (1990, 33). 
Just as Melanie Klein asked Erich to leave his illusions behind, she her- 
self would have to change not just her philosophical hopes for the power 
of rationality to liberate inhibitions but also the cultural desires that ren- 
dered her approach so ideological in its faith toward the curative effects 
of knowledge. Significantly, Klein's narcissism was also at stake: first as a 
mother who wished for omnipotence over the child's development, then 
as a teacher who wished to master the mysteries of how the child learns, 
and finally as an analyst who wishes to solve suffering through interpreta- 
tion. And yet, narcissism is not the full story, for Klein's attention to  
Erich's intellectual inhibition was also tied to her own struggles to be rec- 
ognized as a thinker and to  free herself from her history of intellectual 
constraint (Likierman 2001). In this sense, Klein's move from a psychoan- 
alytic education to a psychoanalysis was also a working through, a 
mourning for what is lost when education is ostensibly found. 
A comment offered by Anton von Freund after her paper, while origi- 
nally dismissed, slowly affected her rethinking and her own self-analysis. 
He suggested that her work with Erich was not yet, in its interventions, 
psychoanalytic. While Klein's initial rule was only to answer Erich's direct 
questions and provide him with specific amounts of information, von Fre- 
und argued that a true psychoanalytic education would "take into 
account 'unconscious questions' and reply to them" (Petot 1990, 28-29). 
He also offered practical advice: Klein must distinguish her parental rela- 
tions from the analytic ones, and set up formal times for analysis. It 
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would be the more difficult insistence of von Freund that would distin- 
guish Klein from her peers. To reply to  unconscious questions, Klein 
would have to analyse Erich's phantasies, and this shift in the psychoana- 
lytic object, from the child's conscious occupations to the unconscious 
anxiety, meant that her understanding of the child, the nature of knowl- 
edge, and psychoanalytic cure would also change in dramatic ways. In the 
case of the child, it would be phantasies that inaugurate development. In 
the case of the psychoanalytic encounter, Klein would leave her desire to 
mould the child's character and so abandon educational goals for the less 
certain free association. And finally, as for the question of knowledge, it 
would no longer be on the side of enlightenment: epistemology would be 
brought closer to anxiety and phantasies. Petot's summary of Klein's new 
position still startles: 
The child's good social adaptation and success at school cannot be the 
goals for the child analyst; they are at most secondary.. . "normality" can- 
not be stated in terms of objective criteria, but in terms of liberty, fluidity, 
and variety in the creation of fantasies.. . . No reference to external criteria 
can be acceptable in psychoanalysis.. . . The first lesson of Erich's educa- 
tion may be stated in the following terms: the objectives of the analysis of 
children can be defined only in psychoanalytic terms (1990,44). 
Psychoanalytic cure meant the freeing of phantasy, not rationality. 
Anna Freud (1936) would come to know this tension when she noted one 
of the ego's mechanisms of defense as "intellectualization." But Klein's 
change signified a radical reconsideration of normality and knowledge 
through the making of psychoanalytic knowledge and through the strange 
measure of liberty and creativity. And because Klein felt education could 
not support this reconsideration, it became irrelevant. 
Education was not the only processes set aside. Klein felt that appeals 
to either rapport or to external reality in the analytic session would be of 
no use. Nor could external conditions and the analysts' nurturing quali- 
ties provide any solace for how interpretation might do its work. Klein 
had thus moved from the question of how the world influenced the child's 
development to how the child encountered and created the world of 
object relations. In that move, she threw away any appeal to the impartial 
person that Freud (1926) created in his defense of lay analysis and raised 
a significant dilemma for our theories about knowledge: What are the 
boundaries and limits of education? Because of Klein's approach, there 
will be a respect in child analysis for a gap between "the appearance of 
objective knowledge or savoir-faire and its translation into the sphere of 
object relations; in short between simple knowing and realization. It is 
this gap which is filled by the working through process"(Petot 1991,123). 
This gap is also the one that Freud placed at the heart of psychoanalytic 
training and learning, one that, by its very nature must inaugurate, how- 
ever painfully, theory and its wars. 
Strong disagreement over how analytic insight could be made was part 
of the burgeoning disagreement between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. 
While both analysts utilized play in the analytic setting, their views on 
how to interpret play, or the symbolic reach of the child's relation to 
objects, varied significantly. What analytic scenes were being enacted in 
the analytic session? And, how does transference work in child analysis? 
Anna Freud seemed reticent to affix the child's play solely to psychical 
reality or to use the transference as the basis of interpretation. She argued 
that the child is not yet ready to re-enact new editions of prior love rela- 
tions because the prior relations are not yet past! Indeed, for Anna Freud, 
transference was a developmental achievement. Because the child was still 
in a state of dependency upon the parents, not just in terms of having her 
or his daily physical needs met but also requiring the parent's actual pres- 
ence in the working out of morality, her or his super-ego was also imma- 
ture. This reasoning led Anna Freud to her insistence that the analyst's 
role was one of attempting to  offer herself as an ego ideal and as an 
object of authority. In Anna Freud's (1927, 65)  words, the work of the 
analyst, "combines in his own person two difficult and diametrically 
opposed functions: He has to analyze and educate, that is to say, in the 
same breath he must allow and forbid, loosen and bind again." This is 
also the work of the educator, part of the difficult balance that both inau- 
gurates the trouble of education and assuages, perhaps, the force of its 
experience. 
Herein lies the crux of Klein's argument with Anna Freud: For Melanie 
Klein, the analysis of unconscious anxiety must and can be readily 
encountered as the basis of analytic work. The analyst offers neither 
praise nor blame, only interpretations. As for interpreting the symbolic 
reach of child play, because the child is so closely allied with unconscious 
wishes, play, itself a symbolic representation, is not only comparable to 
free association but its anxiety content is readily observed. There is no 
prerequisite for analysis because for Klein, when it comes to the uncon- 
scious, there is no difference between adults and children and addressing 
the anxieties that have unconscious origins is the work of analysis. Mrs. 
Klein, in her critique of Anna Freud's Introduction to Techniques of Child 
Analysis13 pinpoints their difference directly: "I believe then that a radical 
difference between our attitudes to anxiety and a sense of guilt in children 
is this: that Anna Freud makes use of these feelings to  attach the child to 
herself, while I from the outset enlist them in the service of the analytic 
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work" (1927, 145). Enlisting anxiety, however, also led to a very different 
stance of the analyst. Klein argued that the analyst could no longer be an 
advocate and must adopt a detached stance. She admitted this as a 
painful insistence: "Analysis is not in itself a gentle method: it cannot 
spare the patient any suffering, and this applies equally to children" 
(Original emphasis, 144). 
As if to answer some of these criticisms, Anna Freud published "The 
Theory of Child Analysis (1928 [1927])." Mrs. Klein is only mentioned 
once, as someone who works with play technique in the analysis of small 
children. Like Hug-Hellmuth, Anna Freud emphasizes that the children 
cannot yet construct their history and the troubles brought to the analytic 
setting are utterly current and grounded in conflicts with reality. This dif- 
ference is used to support Anna Freud's view that the child's superego is 
neither archaic nor structured by sadistic phantasies. Rather, it is still 
being built, so to say, and the materials for its construction are the child's 
actual relations to the real parents. In Anna Freud's view, education must 
be an intimate experience in the analytic session, for unlike the adult 
superego that is very difficult to  transform without reconstructing their 
childhood and infantile anxieties, the child is very susceptible to  the 
adult's influence. Miss Freud (1927, 163) also minimizes Klein's insistence 
that education be separated from child analysis by poking at what she 
saw as Klein's anxiety: "I do not see why we should be so frightened of 
this word [education], or regard such a combination of two attitudes as a 
disparagement of analysis." Indeed, in Anna Freud's view, taking educa- 
tion into account allows the analyst to understand the external conditions 
and events that can also affect internal distress. 
Whereas a few years later Anna Freud (1936) would go to great lengths 
to distinguish between "real angst" or justified anxiety made from dan- 
gers in the world and the anxiety that stems from internal conflict, 
Melanie Klein insisted that anxiety emanates from the poesies of percep- 
tion and symbolization: it is a reaction to fear of retaliation, an effect of 
an inaugural confusion between good and bad caused by the imagined 
violence of object relations that begins at the beginning of life. This anxi- 
ety constitutes for Klein, in part, the early super-ego that in turn is sub- 
ject to its own severe phantasies turned against itself. It is a development 
that occurs regardless of external conditions. Thus from the beginning, 
while the super-ego is made from identifications, the identifications are 
made from partial objects, phantasies. While Anna Freud sees the child's 
super-ego as weak and dependent upon real object relations, Melanie 
Klein views the super-ego as violent, sadistic, and severe. For Klein, the 
role of the analyst is not to  help strengthen this psychical agency but 
rather to encounter it: "If the analyst, even only temporarily, becomes the 
representative of the educative agencies, if he assumes the role of the 
super-ego, at that point he blocks the way of the instinctual impulses to 
CS [Consciousness]: he becomes the representative of the repressive facili- 
ties.. . . [Psychoanalysis] must enable [the analyst] to be really willing only 
to analyze and not wish to mold and direct the minds of his patients" 
(1927, 167). 
This is a position that Melanie Klein would maintain throughout her 
long career. Her research would begin, however, with a question that, as 
Pontalis points out, touches both the heart of education and causes its 
aberrations: "What holds the child back?" (1981, 96). Pontalis suggests 
that her research into this question makes all the difference to the tech- 
niques of child analysis: "The technical debate opposing Melanie Klein to 
Anna Freud reflects the confrontation of two ethics: for Anna Freud, in 
the end, it was a question of making the child find the adult's alleged 
autonomy; for Melanie Klein, it was a matter of coming to meet the 
child's psychic reality and measuring adult knowledge against it, 'in the 
spirit of free and unprejudiced researchm'(1981, 96). And yet, the Contro- 
versies did not just oppose these two ethics but necessarily repeated their 
tension. That is, the question of autonomy within a psychoanalytic soci- 
ety was central. But also, along with this was the problem of meeting 
one's own psychical reality in one's theory. One might say that the Con- 
troversies were also about the difficulties of free and unprejudiced 
research in relation to another difficulty, that of acknowledging the prob- 
lem of being free and then, whether this, too, is a conflict that belongs to 
education. 
Phantasy and Reality, Knowledge and Realization 
On September 18, 1933, six years after the difficult exchange between 
Jones and Freud on the future of child analysis, Jones again broached the 
topic of conflict within analytic societies. Historical truths precipitated 
his remarks: a few months before, the death of Ferenczi and across Ger- 
many, the Nazi burning of Freud's books.14 There was also the beginning 
dispersal into exile of the analytic community,15 the impending Anschluss, 
and, in previous letters they exchanged, Freud's deepening depression 
over whether psychoanalysis would survive Nazi persecution.16 Jones, 
however, and perhaps sounding very close to Melanie Klein, felt the 
biggest problem facing psychoanalysis was internal, or "the tendency 
towards quarrelling and internal dissension in so many societies" 
(Paskauskas, 729). He offered Freud three reasons why psychoanalysis 
has not been successful among analysts: 
First, that so many were originally neurotic and have chosen the career as 
a method of holding their neurosis at bay. Secondly, that continued work 
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all day in the realm of the unconscious imposes a strain which only the 
most balanced natures can sustain.. . . Thirdly, and last not least, is the fact 
that so very few of them are adequately analysed (Paskauskas, 729). 
All of these reasons are now our nostalgia in contemporary debates 
that blame educators. Yes, educators, too, suffer from their own educa- 
tion. Yes, education makes us tired. Yes, our education is inadequate. But 
this road leads us to the realm of aggressive phantasy and an obdurate 
reality where there is no such thing as learning at  all. Arguably, with his 
third reason Jones returns to the scene of the crime, accusing Freud of not 
analysing his daughter sufficiently. This strategy is, as AndrC Green sug- 
gests recently, all too common and rather tautological: "The analyst's 
feelings when confronted with failure can be divided broadly into two 
categories: paranoia projection ('it's the patient's fault; he was un- 
analysable') and depressive self-accusation ('it's the fault of the bad ana- 
lyst who was badly analysed')" (1999, 101). But there are also, in these 
observations, glimpses of something more difficult, namely the experience 
of uncertainty, and of not knowing, the difficulty of both reality and 
phantasy. On one level, Jones's reasons could be read as signalling a cen- 
tral problem that inaugurates both the psychoanalytic dialogue and the 
educational dialogue: how do practices account for their own limits and 
what can these accounts mean to practitioners? Where do limits come 
from and what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the world? 
What is the relation between the inside or the psychical and the outside 
or the social? How does one know the irrational from the rational? How 
does one tell the difference between knowledge and its realization? How 
much of the failure of a project, a theory, or a practice is due to its own 
internal conflicts and how much is due to outside conditions? Finally, 
what if education emerges from these very breakdowns of meaning, this 
very uncertainty? 
On another level, there is the story of interminable education, an utterly 
human endeavour made from the flaws of perception, projection, resis- 
tance to knowledge, and yes, even theory. There is something in our edu- 
cation that is radically unknowlable and has been named, over the course 
of my arguments as the gap between knowledge and its realization, 
between reality and phantasy, between resistence and insight. If we believe 
Jones, the difficulties of the field can be found within the practitioner's 
limits and not the limits of the clients. If we consider Green, then the 
more difficult question is: How can a profession think within its failures 
and work through its defences against that which it cannot understand? 
Freud, too, would acknowledge this aporia in one of his last papers, 
"Constructions in Analysis." There, Freud does not settle this difficulty 
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with knowledge. Instead, he illustrates the problem even more, drawing 
from his well-worn metaphor, archaeology, but now, offering some distinc- 
tions between the work of the analyst and the work of the archaeologist: 
that psychical objects are incomparably more complicated than the excava- 
tor's material ones and that we have insufficient knowledge of what we may 
expect to find, since their finer structure contains so much that is still mys- 
terious. But our comparison between the two forms of work can go no fur- 
ther than this; for the main difference between them lies in the fact that for 
the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim and end of his endeavours 
while for analysis the construction is only a preliminary labour (1937, 260). 
Regardless of technique, the capacity for the analysands to construct 
meaning is just the beginning of analytic work. We are back to the place 
Eigen formulated as "a gap between knowing about X and being X 
between knowledge and its realization. And we are also facing our own 
education, our preliminary labour. 
"Constructions in Analysis" also suggests something of the divide and 
the bridge between constructions and historical truths, or what Anna 
Freud and Melanie Klein have been calling phantasies and reality. Tracing 
the elegant design of delusions, Freud returns to the poetic view of a 
method in madness by offering the idea that there resides within madness 
"a fragment of historical truth" (1937,267). Just what precisely this truth 
might be, or what counts as significant, would be the work of the analyst 
and the analysand. And this construction would only prepare the com- 
mon ground for them to begin their work. Perhaps such a construction 
can help us think about resistance to education and how this resistance is 
also the grounds of education. There is a certain logic in not learning. 
What complicates this logic is that fragments of historical truth also lie in 
the gap between knowledge and its realization; that is, the truth of one's 
experience, one's education, will always be a problem. The Freud-Klein 
Controversies and our own contemporary debates, however, suggest that 
the kernel of historical truth is not easily found, especially when it seems 
to be covered over by institutional denials of the troubles that inaugurate 
practices. Then, the common ground of education seems to collapse from 
the very weight that constitutes it in the first place, namely the uncanny 
play of reality and phantasies and the accompanying positions of alliance 
and detachment. 
What then is education that it should give us so much trouble? In his 
re-reading of Klein's discussion on Richard, one of her adolescent 
analysands, Adam Philips (1996, 108) argues that Melanie Klein's tech- 
nique of child analysis offers the question from where or whom does the 
unconscious come. Klein did not ask this question herself, but her inter- 
pretations are sustained by the view that to understand the force of reality 
one must go directly to the inner world of phantasy, a world that is a pro- 
found argument over what becomes of reality when it must pass through 
object relations and when reality is encountered before it can be known. 
And yet, the articulation of unconscious phantasy cannot be direct 
because there are always two questions: To what does play refer? And, 
then, how much play should interpretation enjoy? From a Kleinian view, 
we can ask the same of education: from where or whom does education 
come? Is it in the desire to know or is this desire somehow learned from 
the other? Is this desire for education on the side of phantasy or reality? 
And, must we really choose at all? 
Anna Freud's unasked question comes from a different direction: from 
where and whom does authority come? How can we know if we are tak- 
ing the side of the child, and when do we leave behind our own insis- 
tences and allow for our own gap between knowledge and its realization? 
These questions are also sustained by her view that to understand the 
force of phantasy, one must call the ego back to the world of education 
and that, moving close to Kleinian theory after the Controversies, part of 
this call must urge reparative forces, not just for the world but for the 
ego's relation to knowledge as well. Anna Freud knew that education, 
even in its most gentle and well intentioned moves, could still be a blow 
to narcissism, that desire for itself the ego also requires in order to ven- 
ture out into the world and risk desire for others. Anna Freud is asking 
education to repair its own harm. What she would also understand, and 
this she shared with Klein, is that such a repair can only occur after some- 
thing broke. And this something, we might speculate, could reside either 
in phantasies or in reality, in knowledge or its realization. This was and is 
the trouble of education, then and now. Chances are, that something, 
those fragments of historical truth and that kernel of madness, are what 
makes education so difficult, subject to aggression and to desires for mak- 
ing reparation. It is also a chance that Freud called working through, and 
what we might come to risk as a theory of controversial learning that 
leans toward that difficult liberty the analysts called "free association." 
Notes 
Author's Note: This research was funded by  the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council o f  Canada (Grant #410-98-1028), "Difficult knowledge in teaching and learning: 
A psychoanalytic inquiry." The views expressed here do not represent the Council. This 
paper draws from my larger unpublished manuscript, After Education: Anna Freud, 
Melanie Klein and Psychoanalytic Histories of Learning. I also benefitted from the 
thoughtful responses o f  Jen Gilbert and Alice Pitt. 
Smoke I I I 
1. Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner edited the papers and discussions that go under the title 
The Freud-Klein Controversies, 1941 -45. This edition, running 966 pages, is noteworthy in 
so many regards: it contains the minutes from the Extraordinary meetings, papers and 
responses read during the meetings, transcripts of arguments, and memorandums and reso- 
lutions from members. King and Steiner's retrospective commentaries draw upon private 
correspondences and, then, their analytic insight. To give readers a sense of the internecine 
relations, listen to how analyst Sylvia Payne in a letter to Ernest Jones dated August 1, 1945 
described the protagonists: 
I think that Anna Freud has several very weak character traits and I am sure that she 
will not hesitate to try and get what she wants without considering the opinions of 
those who differ from her. I fancy that her father was the only person who could pre- 
vent this, and as she must have taken over Freud's determination to keep psychoanla- 
ysis isolated and to allow no-one in who has character traits of omnipotence, I 
cannot see any hope of compromising in any way. Unfortunately, we have the same 
omnipotence in Melanie [Klein] and this is really why her work has made so much 
trouble; it is in her personality (Cited in King and Steiner 1991, p. 914). 
For a history of child analysis, see Bick, 1987; Geissmann and Geissmann, 1998; 
Grosskurth, 1987; Rodriguez, 1999; and Young Bruehl, 1988. Both Melanie Klein (1955) 
and Anna Freud (1966) also wrote brief essays on this history although from the vantage of 
their respective techniques and perhaps to continue their arguments with one another. 
2. The list of participants is impressive and begins Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner's (1991) 
compilation of the meeting notes and papers. Three schools of thought were represented: 
The Anna Freudians, the Kleinians, and the Independents (see King and Steiner, pp. xi- 
xxv). King and Steiner also suggest the main protagonists: ". . . for scientific purposes, the 
main argument was between Edward Glover, Melitta and Walter Schmideberg, Willi and 
Hedwig Hoffer, Barbara Low, Dorthory Burlingham, Barbara Lantos, and Kate Friedlan- 
der, who, along with Anna Freud, opposed the new ideas of Melanie Klein, whose main 
supporters were Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Paula Heinmann, Donald Winnicott, and John 
Rickman"(p.3). 
3. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973,112) in their entry on "deferred actions" note three char- 
acteristics of Nachtraglichkeit: an experience that cannot be assimilated into lived experi- 
ence; a revision of the first event because of a second event, and uneven development. In 
each of these characteristics there is a secondary working over of an earlier event. The 
term, "afterwardness" is used by Laplanche (1992). 
4. The FreudIJones Correspondence (Paskauskas, 1993) spanned 1908-1939, until Freud 
went into exile and joined Jones in London. This correspondence is a touchstone for con- 
temporary discussions of the KleinlFreud Controversies. See, for example Rose; Stone- 
bridge and Phillips; and Steiner (1985). 
5. Grosskurth's (1986, p.172) discussion of this exchange asks the provocative question, 
"Did Jones suspect that Freud had analyzed Anna?" 
6. Free association, letting anything come to mind, makes psychoanalysis very different 
from other modes of psychology. But it is also, according to Christopher Bollas (1999,63), 
a profound critique of epistemology: "To ask Western man to discover truth by abandoning 
the effort to find it and adopting instead the leisurely task of simply stating what crosses 
the mind moment to moment is to undermine the entire structure of Western Epistemol- 
ogy.'' This is so because the boundary between the relevant and irrelevant is no longer at 
stake, nor is the wish for knowledge to interfere with freely associating. 
7. Philosophically, the German word, Aufklarung refers to The Enlightenment. But it also 
means "clearing up, solution, information, and explaining the facts of life to children" 
(Collins German Concise Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v.). As it was used in the early history of 
child analysis, education was thought to remove inhibitions and repressions caused by 
social pressures and adult mythology offered in answering the child's sexual questions. (See 
also Pontalis, 1981.) 
8. Michel Foucault's (1997) discussion of Kant's essay "Was ist Aufklarung" argues that 
the Enlightenment is best thought of as an attitude, "a way out, an exit" (305) from imma- 
turity rather than a discrete perodicalization of time. A new question Kant asked, "What 
differences does today introduce with respect to yesterday?" (305) allows for his interest in 
reason's reconstruction of authority, will, and obligation. This question is also relevant to 
the analytic session, and supports, as discussed later in my essay, Freud's notion of con- 
struction. 
9. The epistemophilic instinct was an early theory of Klein's designating the urge or desire 
to know. What gives this instinct urgency is sexuality and what gives the instinct its aggres- 
sion is sadism. In Klein's view, for the infant, knowing and taking possession of a thing are 
synonymous and this relation or symbolic equivalent means that there is a sadistic impulse 
behind curiosity, made even more cruel because curiosity emerges prior to the acquisition 
of language and hence understanding. Thus, the epistemophilic instinct emerges from bus- 
tration and anxiety. (For a thoughtful discussion on the difficulties of this term and its links 
to Klein's notion of an early Oedipal complex, see Petot 1990, 190-196.) 
10. Ricardo Steiner's (1985,55) discussion on how psychoanalytic research differs from 
other forms of human studies is quite clear on this point: "Psychoanalytical discussion and 
development aim to provide a better understanding of the affective and phantasamatic 
processes which lie at the root of neurotic and psychotic disturbances. They are also con- 
cerned with understanding these problems as they appear amongst researchers who are con- 
cerned with them." 
11. Nancy Chodorow's (1999) discussion of a psychoanalytic orientation to anthropology 
offers a more complex consideration. She makes a compelling argument that there may be 
more similarity between certain forms of psychoanalysis and anthropology, provided that 
anthropologists use their feelings as a means of understanding and that culture as a concept 
allow for pre-discursive influence (See Chapters 5-6). 
12. Hug-Hellmuth argued that children under the age of seven or eight were not ready for 
analysis. But even then, the analyst must understand the differences between child and 
adult analysis. She identified three differences: the child is not in analysis voluntarily but is 
brought by the parents; the child does not have a past to explore but is in the midst of the 
difficulties; and the child has no desire to change herself. 
13. This title was eventually published in English as "Four Lectures on Child Analysis 
1927[1926])" in Volume I of Anna Freud's collected writings. 
14. Friedlander (l997,57) describes the shift in Nazi policy in 1933 from economic boy- 
cott and destruction of Jewish businesses to attacks on culture: 
On the evening of May 10 [1933], rituals of exorcism took place in most of the uni- 
versity cities and towns of Germany. More than twenty thousand books were burned 
in Berlin, and from two to three thousand in every other major German city. In 
Berlin a huge bonfire was lit in front of the Kroll Opera House, and Goebbels was 
one of the speakers. After the speeches, in the capital as in the other cities, slogans 
against the banned authors were chanted by the throng as poisonous books (by Karl 
Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle, Sigmund Freud, Maximilian Harden, and Kurt Tucholsky, 
among many others) were hurled, batch after batch, into the flames. 
15. Pearl King reports that the following Berlin analysts who left for London in 1933: 
Paula Heimann, Heinz Foulkes, Kate Friedlander, Eva Rosenfeld, and Hans Thorner. The 
Freuds went into exile and left for London on June 6,1938. On September 23, 1939, 
almost to the day that Britain declared war on Germany, Freud died. After war was 
declared, analysts who had lived in Germany but now resided in London were declared 
enemy aliens and were not allowed free travel beyond London. Also see Goggin and Gog- 
gin's (2001) description of the Berlin and Vienna Jewish analysts's exile. 
16. Goggin and Goggin (2001) offer a sustained discussion of the devastating transforma- 
tion of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute into the Nazi-run Goring Institute. They docu- 
ment how psychoanalytic education and its practices cannot survive in totalitarianism and 
indeed, the FreudKlein Controversies could not have occurred in the Nazi take-over of 
German psychoanalysis because in Germany and Austria, absolute loyalty to the Nazi State 
defined the parameters of illness and health and, euphemistic language obscured genocidal 
policies, and discussion of Freud's work was forbidden. 
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